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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal from an order of the district court 
imposing heavy sanctions upon a law firm, several of its 
partners, and its client for discovery violations in 
connection with a large environmental lawsuit. The client, 
Esso, is charged in the underlying complaint with having 
poisoned "the wells" in the Estate Tutu area in the eastern 
end of St. Thomas by releasing from the Esso Tutu service 
station petroleum hydrocarbons and chlorinated 
hydrocarbons into the Tutu aquifer which supplies drinking 
water to much of the east end of the island. The discovery 
abuse primarily involves the alleged suppression by Esso's 
former counsel in the litigation, the San Juan, Puerto Rico 
law firm of Goldman, Antonetti, Ferraiuoli & Axtmayer, of a 
report by Jose Agrelot, a professional engineer, 
summarizing the results of soil and liquid tests he had 
performed at the Esso Tutu site in December 1989. The 
suppression of this report is claimed to have dramatically 
increased the discovery time and expense for other parties 
in connection with their prosecution of the case. There are 
also other alleged, though less aggravated, instances of 
obdurate discovery-related behavior. 
 
What specially marks this case is the character and 
magnitude of the sanctions imposed. Eschewing the 
auspices of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, which authorizes sanctions 
for failure to make disclosure or cooperate in discovery, the 
district court imposed the challenged sanctions under its 
inherent power. The sanction imposed on the lawyers was 
suspension from practice in the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands: Jose Cepeda and Francis Torres for three years, 
and Eugenio Romero for one year. The sanction imposed 
upon Esso was the payment of $750,000 to a "Community 
Service Sanction Account" to be utilized to fund 
construction of a halfway house on St. Thomas, the 
training of inmates, and renovation of the St. Thomas 
Criminal Justice Complex. The sanction imposed upon 
Goldman Antonetti was the payment of $250,000 to the 
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Community Service Sanction Account (for the same 
purpose), and the sum of $120,000 as counsel fees and 
costs ($30,000 incurred by each of four moving parties for 
time they spent in connection with the sanctions 
proceedings themselves). Esso was similarly assessed a 
sanction of $30,000 to be paid to each of four other 
movants, but Esso has paid that sum and does not 
challenge it on this appeal. 
 
Goldman Antonetti, its three named partners, and Esso 
appeal the sanctions imposed against them on a variety of 
grounds. The parties who were awarded sanctions to 
compensate them for the time expended in the sanctions 
hearings have cross-appealed, alleging that they are entitled 
to sizable additional sanctions for discovery misconduct 
that caused harm in other phases of the lawsuit, and that 
the district court abused its discretion in summarily 
dismissing these other sanctions requests on the grounds 
that the moving papers were insufficiently specific. Finally, 
several parties against whom Esso has brought claims 
for contribution in the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 
aspect of the underlying district court proceeding (that is all 
that remains, since the common law claims have been 
settled) have cross-appealed from the district court's refusal 
to dismiss those claims as a sanction against Esso for its 
discovery misconduct. 
 
We will vacate the suspensions imposed upon Cepeda, 
Torres, and Romero for procedural reasons. They did not 
receive notice prior to the sanctions hearing that 
suspension was being considered as a possible sanction. 
Concomitantly, they did not have the opportunity to 
properly defend against such a sanction and introduce 
mitigating evidence. As a result, the court's imposition of 
sanctions against Cepeda, Torres, and Romero violated due 
process requirements. 
 
We will also vacate the provision of the district court's 
order requiring Esso and Goldman Antonetti to pay a total 
of $1,000,000 to the Community Service Sanction Account. 
The court simply had no power to order Esso and Goldman 
Antonetti to pay money to benefit the St. Thomas penal 
system. 
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We do, however, affirm the sanction of $120,000 against 
Goldman Antonetti. Although Goldman Antonetti has made 
quite forceful arguments that its discovery misconduct with 
respect to the Agrelot summary memo could not have 
caused all of the costs and expenses claimed by the 
movants, particularly in view of its having disclosed the 800 
pages of technical material on which the memo was based, 
we cannot say, reviewing the record as a whole, that the 
district court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions of 
$120,000. We also reject Goldman Antonetti's contention 
that it is relieved of the obligation to pay this sanction by 
a release by which several of the parties gave up claims 
against Esso and its attorneys. The district court did not 
clearly err in concluding that the language in the release 
was not broad enough to cover Goldman Antonetti, Esso's 
former attorneys, and that the context of the release did not 
suggest otherwise. 
 
We are also satisfied that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in refusing to award additional sanctions 
because of the failure of the movants to provide papers 
adequate to assess the harm caused by the violation. 
District courts, which are extremely busy, should not be 
burdened with re-inventing the wheel in incredibly complex 
litigation in order to sort out voluminous sanctions claims. 
 
The foregoing threshold summary effectively disposes of 
all appeals except the cross-appeals seeking dismissal of 
the claims for contribution. However, we do not have 
appellate jurisdiction over these cross-appeals. Because our 
review of that aspect of the district court's order would 
necessarily involve an analysis of the merits of the 
underlying dispute and because the district court's order is 
reviewable only after final judgment, we do not have 
jurisdiction over this non-final order under the only 
potentially viable basis therefor -- the collateral order 
doctrine. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Co., 337 U.S. 
541 (1949). We note in this regard that this aspect of the 
case differs from the appeal of Goldman Antonetti. Under 
Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 
535 (3d Cir. 1985), we have appellate jurisdiction over an 
order that finally resolves the imposition of sanctions 
against attorneys no longer in the underlying case. We also 
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review those aspects of the appeal not brought by, but 
inextricably intertwined with, the issues raised by Goldman 
Antonetti, i.e., Esso's contentions pertaining to the 
Community Service Sanction Account and the claims of 
other parties pertaining to the level of monetary sanctions 
awarded them, under the doctrine of pendent appellate 
jurisdiction. See Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440 
(3d Cir. 1982). 
 
We would prefer to be able to adjudicate the cross- 
appeals concerning the contribution claims because we 
have spent a great deal of time both in brief reading and at 
oral argument in familiarizing ourselves with the case. 
However, as a court of limited jurisdiction, we do not 
dispose of matters that are not properly the subject of 
appellate jurisdiction. We also do not encourage a§ 1292(b) 
certification because the complexion of the issues involved 
in these other appeals may change as matters proceed 
before the district court. The extraordinarily able district 
judge, who has been adroitly managing this complex and 
vexatious case for a number of years now, may be able, by 
subsequent rulings, to put these matters in a sufficiently 
different light as to render them susceptible to more facile 
disposition down the road. 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. Background And Overview 
 
In the summer of 1987, a water well owner noticed the 
smell of gasoline emanating from his well. He contacted 
local environmental officials who, with the help of the 
federal government, began an investigation into possible 
contamination of the Tutu aquifer. Investigators discovered 
the presence of gasoline and chlorinated organics in the 
aquifer. Government officials thereafter closed many of the 
wells. 
 
The discovery of the contamination led to a number of 
private lawsuits. Detailed explication of the anatomy of the 
various suits is unnecessary; it is sufficient to note that the 
private litigation seeks to assign responsibility for the 
contamination between and among a number of possible 
 
                                9 
contaminators, including but not limited to two automobile 
service stations, an automobile dealer, a shopping plaza, a 
dry cleaner, and a former textile plant. That private 
litigation also includes claims for contribution under 
CERCLA. The parties in the litigation include both possible 
contaminators and businesses and landowners allegedly 
harmed by the contamination.1 The law firm of Goldman, 
Antonetti, Ferraiuoli & Axtmayer ("Goldman Antonetti") 
represented Esso for much of the period in question but no 
longer does so.2 
 
Discovery began in 1989. During this discovery, Esso and 
Goldman Antonetti employed practices the district court 
found to be sanctionable. In its three opinions regarding 
the sanctions, the district court grouped the discovery 
violations into three categories. First, the court found that 
Esso and its attorneys engaged in a strategy that kept the 
various other parties in the litigation from obtaining needed 
information in a timely fashion. See In re Tutu Wells 
Contamination Litig., 162 F.R.D. 46, 70-71 (D.V.I. 1995) 
[hereinafter "Tutu I"]. Without delving into the specifics of 
individual abuses, the court noted that Esso and Goldman 
Antonetti met many discovery requests with legal tactics 
intended to delay, oppress, or harass their opponents. 
Often, Esso and Goldman Antonetti would refuse to turn 
over requested documents until forced to do so by court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The parties relevant to our discussion, are Esso Standard Oil, S.A. 
Ltd., Esso Virgin Islands, Inc., and Esso Standard Oil Co. (Puerto Rico) 
(collectively "Esso"); Rhoda Harthman, Charlotte Labarre, Albert 
Harthman, Arthur Harthman, Austin Harthman, Edgar Harthman, 
Sammy Harthman, P.I.D., Inc., and Tutu Services Limited (collectively 
"PID/Harthman") (owners of a shopping center); Texaco, Inc. and Texaco 
Caribbean, Inc. (collectively "Texaco"); Vernon Morgan; Laga Industries, 
Ltd., Duplan Corp., Panex Company, Paul Lazare, and Andreas Gal 
(collectively "the Laga Defendants") (operators of a former textile plant); 
Four Winds Plaza Partnership ("Four Winds") (owners of a shopping 
center); Ramsay Motors, Inc. ("Ramsay Motors"); L'Henri, Inc. ("L'Henri") 
(a dry cleaner); and Western Auto Supply Company ("Western Auto"). 
Excluded from this list are the plaintiffs from the so-called Total Vision 
case. None of the plaintiffs in that case are involved in the sanctions 
dispute. 
 
2. Goldman Antonetti has since changed its name, and is now called 
Goldman, Antonetti & Cordova. 
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order. According to the court, the level of judicial 
involvement in the discovery process was consequently 
unusually high, requiring the court unnecessarily to devote 
significant resources to resolving ordinary discovery 
disputes. 
 
Second, the court focused on the handling of the so- 
called Agrelot memorandum. In December 1989, Soil Tech, 
a company that specializes in environmental analyses of 
soil, took samples from the soil at the Esso Tutu Service 
Station ("ETSS") and from liquid in a holding tank at ETSS. 
Soil Tech sent those samples to the Environmental Testing 
and Certification Corp. ("ETC") for analysis. ETC returned 
the results of the investigation to Soil Tech shortly 
thereafter. The results revealed some contamination. Jose 
Agrelot, President of Soil Tech, received the preliminary 
results and summarized them in a memorandum, which he 
forwarded to Goldman Antonetti in anticipation of a 
meeting in January 1990. ETC produced the final results of 
the testing shortly after the meeting had occurred. Agrelot 
testified that he discussed the memorandum with attorneys 
at Goldman Antonetti, including Jose Cepeda and Francis 
Torres. It is not clear from the record, however, whether 
Cepeda ever actually saw the Agrelot memorandum at that 
time. The results were also discussed at a May, 1990 
meeting at which Eugenio Romero was present along with 
Cepeda, Torres, and Agrelot, among others. 
 
Although for the most part the Agrelot memorandum 
merely summarized the information contained in the ETC 
findings, the memorandum did include a map pinpointing 
the locations of the soil borings from which the tested soil 
was taken. It appears from the record that, without the 
Agrelot memorandum, someone examining the ETC data 
could not determine with precision the location of the 
borings. The record does, however, give some indication 
that there is enough information in the ETC supporting 
data that was made available to determine that the ETC 
analyzed soil from ETSS rather than from some other 
location above the Tutu aquifer. Esso and its attorneys 
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produced the full ETC report on which the Agrelot 
memorandum was based.3 
 
However, neither Esso, Goldman Antonetti, nor Soil Tech 
turned over the Agrelot memorandum during discovery 
until October 1993. Prior to that time, various parties had 
specifically requested all reports generated from soil and 
groundwater testing in the Tutu area, but the responses to 
such requests, either signed by or reviewed by Esso 
employees or Goldman Antonetti attorneys, made no 
mention of the Agrelot memorandum. The reasons for this 
omission are not clear. Lawyers from Goldman Antonetti 
testified that the Agrelot memorandum had been indexed 
incorrectly in their computer database; Agrelot himself 
testified that the memorandum had been labeled incorrectly 
and therefore misfiled in his office. The district court found 
that the failure to produce the Agrelot memorandum was 
intentional. See Id. at 65-66. At all events, only after Agrelot 
had searched his files in the fall of 1993 to assist Esso in 
negotiating a case management order did he find the 
memorandum and turn it over to Esso, who revealed it to 
its new counsel Archer & Greiner. It was Archer & Greiner 
that finally notified the other parties of its existence. 
 
The third category of violations occurred in connection 
with an attempted inspection underneath the surface of the 
ETSS site. In particular, the plaintiffs wished to determine 
whether an underground storage tank was located on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. It is also not clear from the record, and the parties disagreed at oral 
argument, when each of the parties received the ETC data and whether 
Esso and its attorneys complied with court orders governing the 
production of such material. It seems that the confusion arises because 
Esso and its attorneys apparently did not physically produce the ETC 
data to each and every party who may have requested it. However, at 
oral argument Esso and its attorneys plausibly asserted that court 
orders managing discovery envisioned that the parties seeking such 
reports would coordinate among themselves examination of such reports. 
According to Esso and its attorneys, to avoid duplicative and 
unnecessary production of lengthy documents (for example, the ETC 
report exceeds 800 pages) they needed only produce to late-coming 
parties a list or catalogue of reports already produced, and those parties 
could then examine the reports in the possession of other parties. We do 
not resolve this issue here. 
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site, and also to trace the pipes leading out of the oil/water 
separator located on the site. The parties refer to this 
aspect of the discovery as the "anomaly investigation." In 
May, 1992, the plaintiffs employed ground penetrating 
radar ("GPR") to examine the area beneath the ETSS. The 
GPR turned up an anomalous shadow in the corner of the 
site, possibly indicating the presence of an underground 
storage tank. Esso claimed that the GPR produced a false 
result because of interference from overhead power lines or 
from a reinforcing bar in a nearby retaining wall. The 
magistrate judge ultimately ordered an excavation of the 
site to determine once and for all if such a tank existed. It 
did not. 
 
Excavation of the site was to occur in accordance with 
the magistrate judge's order. However, according to the 
district court, Esso failed to comply with this order. See Id. 
at 52-53. Instead, Esso began the excavation after a delay 
of several hours and did not have the necessary tools or 
machinery ready for the investigation. Further, Esso did not 
adequately conduct the pipe tracing phase of the 
investigation. This failure led to months of wrangling among 
the parties and between Esso and the court until Esso 
finally conducted the investigation to the satisfaction of the 
court, nearly 10 months after the investigation was 
scheduled to be completed. 
 
B. The District Court's Opinions and Orders  
 
In three separate opinions, the district court discussed 
its findings with respect to these violations and issued 
orders imposing sanctions for them. In the first of the three 
opinions, the court began by detailing the anomaly 
investigation, see id. at 51-54, and the Agrelot 
memorandum affair, see id. at 54-62. The court went on to 
describe briefly the sources of law on which it planned to 
rely in imposing sanctions: its inherent powers; Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 26(g), and 37; and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927. See id. at 62-63. The court next found that the 
failure to produce the Agrelot memorandum was not 
inadvertent and that this failure was non-responsive to 
discovery requests, notwithstanding the fact that the ETC 
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data on which the memorandum relied was actually 
produced. See id. at 65-71. 
 
Finally, the court examined the possible sanctions. It 
observed that monetary awards for the fees and costs 
associated with the attempts to find evidence of the release 
of contaminants from the ETSS, the investigation costs 
resulting from the failure to produce the Agrelot 
memorandum, and the fees and costs incurred as part of 
the sanctions proceedings were all potentially recoverable. 
See id. at 72-73. After reviewing the controlling case of 
Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 
1984), the court reasoned that dismissal of Esso's CERCLA 
contribution claims against the other parties was also 
possible. See id. at 73-78. It concluded its discussion of 
possible sanctions by finding that Cepeda, Romero, and 
Torres could be sanctioned for their role in the discovery 
violations. See id. at 78-80. 
 
Instead of imposing sanctions at that time, the court 
ordered that Esso, Goldman Antonetti, Cepeda, Romero, 
and Torres show cause why the court should not sanction 
them for their actions. The court also provided the parties 
with the opportunity to negotiate a mutual resolution of the 
monetary sanctions prior to the hearing to show cause. See 
id. at 81. 
 
In its next opinion on the matter, the court disposed of 
motions from Esso, Goldman Antonetti, Cepeda, Romero, 
and Torres seeking clarification, reconsideration, and 
modification of its earlier orders. First, the court disposed 
of claims that its hearings with respect to sanctions were 
conducted without due process. The court engaged in a 
detailed review of the orders, discussions, and hearings 
leading up to the sanctions proceedings and concluded 
that, taken together, the process provided ample notice of 
and opportunity to be heard regarding the sanctions faced 
by the various parties. See In re Tutu Wells Contamination 
Litig., 162 F.R.D. 81, 83-88 (D.V.I. 1995) [hereinafter "Tutu 
II"]. Next, the court held that the moving parties had 
produced no evidence sufficient to warrant a reexamination 
of its earlier factual findings. See id. at 88-89. Finally, the 
court rescribed its earlier holding that the actions of the 
moving parties prejudiced the other parties. See id. at 90- 
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91. Esso, Goldman Antonetti, Cepeda, Romero, and Torres 
therefore still were required to show cause why monetary 
sanctions and dismissal of claims should not be imposed 
on them. See id. at 91. 
 
In its third and final opinion on the matter, the court 
decided what sanctions to impose on each of the parties. It 
began by finding that neither Esso, Goldman Antonetti, 
Cepeda, Romero, nor Torres had shown sufficient cause for 
the court not to impose some sanction on each of them. See 
In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 166 F.R.D. 331, 334- 
39 (D.V.I. 1996) [hereinafter "Tutu III"]. Instead, the court 
found that severe sanctions were merited. Because of the 
need to impose such severe sanctions, the court decided to 
rely exclusively on its inherent power to sanction. See id. at 
337. As for non-monetary sanctions, the court first held 
that dismissing the CERCLA contribution claims would be 
inappropriate because doing so would place too great a 
burden on Esso to clean up the contamination of the 
aquifer (the court apparently believed that other parties 
shared responsibility for the contamination). Instead, the 
court reasoned that monetary sanctions would be adequate 
to achieve the goals of sanctioning. See id. at 339-40. Next, 
the court suspended Cepeda, Romero, and Torres from 
practicing before the District Court of the Virgin Islands. 
See id. at 339-41.4 Cepeda and Torres received three-year 
suspensions. Because of contrition expressed to the court, 
Romero received a suspension of only one year. See id. at 
341. 
 
As for monetary sanctions, the court declined to award 
substantial sanctions in favor of the parties to the lawsuit 
(who had been unable to settle the monetary sanctions). 
See id. at 341-45. The parties to whom sanctions might be 
paid had submitted their requests for fees and costs to the 
court for review. The court found, however, that the 
submissions, which were voluminous but quite generalized, 
failed to make clear the basis for the parties' claims and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Romero and Torres were admitted to practice before the court pro hac 
vice. There is some dispute as to whether Cepeda was technically 
admitted. Because of the particular manner in which we resolve the 
appeal of the suspensions, we do not resolve this issue here. 
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failed to provide records sufficient to justify the requested 
awards as sanctions. Instead of examining the submissions 
line-by-line, which the court did not feel obliged to do given 
the failure of the parties to be sufficiently specific, the court 
denied the bulk of the requests. See id. at 342-43. However, 
the court did believe that some sanction was warranted. It 
held that the costs associated with the sanctions 
proceedings themselves would be an appropriate sanction. 
To determine those costs, the court, expressing admiration 
for the stewardship of Nancy D'Anna, counsel for L'Henri, 
used the submissions of L'Henri as a model. 
 
L'Henri sought approximately $30,000 as costs for the 
sanctions proceedings. The court decided that such an 
award was reasonable, and awarded all eight parties 
seeking monetary sanctions $30,000 each. See id. at 344. 
Because Esso and Goldman Antonetti were equal partners 
in the discovery violations, the court reasoned, each should 
bear equally the burden of the sanction. See id. Therefore, 
the court ordered Esso to pay $30,000 each to Ramsay 
Motors, L'Henri, PID/Harthman, and Vernon Morgan. See 
id. Since Esso had already negotiated a settlement with 
these four parties as to monetary sanctions, and paid them 
a total of approximately $170,000, the court considered 
this portion of Esso's sanction to be satisfied. See id. at 344 
n.13. The court ordered Goldman Antonetti to pay $30,000 
each to the other movants, Four Winds, the Laga 
Defendants, Western Auto, and Texaco. See id. at 344. 
 
Finally, the court determined that additional sanctions 
against Esso and Goldman Antonetti were required. See id. 
at 345-52. Recognizing that it was adopting a novel 
approach to sanctioning, the court ordered Esso to pay 
$750,000 and Goldman Antonetti to pay $250,000 to a 
Community Service Sanction Account that would be used 
to fund construction of a halfway house on St. Thomas, the 
training of inmates, and renovation of the St. Thomas 
Criminal Justice Complex. See id. The court opined that the 
parties truly harmed by the contamination of the Tutu 
aquifer and the delay in resolving responsibility over the 
contamination were the citizens of the Virgin Islands. 
Therefore, the most appropriate beneficiary of a sanction 
award, it reasoned, would be the Virgin Islands itself. And, 
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because the Criminal Justice Center was in such great 
need of additional resources, it would be, the court 
believed, a suitable project towards which the funds could 
be directed. 
 
C. Anatomy of the Appeals 
 
These appeals ensued. The following is a capsule 
summary of those appeals. Esso and Goldman Antonetti 
appeal the court's decision to use its inherent powers to 
require that they pay a total of $1,000,000 towards the 
Criminal Justice Center. Goldman Antonetti also appeals 
the imposition of the $120,000 monetary sanction payable 
to the other parties in the case. Cepeda, Romero, and 
Torres appeal their suspensions from practicing law in the 
Virgin Islands. Four Winds, L'Henri, Vernon Morgan, 
PID/Harthman, Ramsay Motors, and Texaco appeal the 
court's decision to award only $30,000 to each of them as 
a sanction from either Esso or Goldman Antonetti; all of 
these parties argue that they are entitled to additional 
awards. Neither the Laga Defendants nor Western Auto has 
appealed, though Western Auto argues that should we 
determine that parties are entitled to additional sanctions, 
it should be similarly entitled.5 The Department of Justice 
of the Virgin Islands has submitted an amicus curiae brief 
urging us to uphold the sanction award directed towards 
the Criminal Justice Center. 
 
Some aspects of our appellate jurisdiction over this 
matter are complicated. Because our jurisdiction in this 
case depends on the particular aspect of the appeal that we 
are examining, we will discuss jurisdiction together with 
each aspect of the merits. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Because we find that no party is entitled to additional sanctions, we 
do not reach the question whether Western Auto would be entitled to 
additional sanctions even though it has not appealed. 
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II. SUSPENSIONS OF ATTORNEYS CEPEDA, 
ROMERO, AND TORRES 
 
A. Appellate Jurisdiction 
 
Appellate jurisdiction over the appeals of Cepeda, 
Romero, and Torres arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which 
provides that the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals of final decisions 
of the District Court of the Virgin Islands. "[A] decision is 
ordinarily considered final and appealable under § 1291 
only if it `ends the litigation on the merits and leaves 
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.' " 
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 
1712, 1718 (1996) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 
229, 233 (1945)). In this case, the decision to suspend 
Cepeda, Romero, and Torres is not final in the usual sense. 
The claims for CERCLA contribution still exist; therefore, 
the litigation on the merits has not ended and the court has 
more to do than simply execute the judgment.6 
 
Under the collateral order doctrine, however, an 
otherwise non-final decision can be appealed if it finally 
and conclusively determines the disputed question, resolves 
an important issue separate from the underlying merits, 
and is effectively unreviewable after final judgment. See 
Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. It is unquestionable that the order 
from which Cepeda, Romero, and Torres appeal finally and 
conclusively determines the issue of their suspensions. We 
turn to whether the order resolves an important issue 
completely separate from the merits that is effectively 
unreviewable after final judgment. 
 
Addressing these issues slightly out of order, we begin 
with the question whether the order suspending Cepeda, 
Romero, and Torres is effectively reviewable after final 
judgment. Subsequent to the actions that gave rise to their 
suspensions, their former client, Esso, retained other 
counsel. Cepeda, Romero, and Torres are no longer in the 
underlying litigation at all. In Eavenson, Auchmuty & 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The claims for CERCLA contribution were separated from the 
common-law claims and have been stayed. 
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Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1985), we 
held that an order imposing Rule 11 sanctions against an 
attorney no longer representing a party in a case was 
collaterally final under Cohen. See id. at 538-40. In that 
case, we reasoned that the attorney could not effectively 
appeal the sanctions after final judgment because the 
parties to the suit might not appeal, leaving open the 
possibility that the attorney would be unable to appeal his 
sanction, and, even if he were able to appeal, the attorney 
may be unaware of the entry of final judgment, leaving 
open the possibility that he would be unable to file a timely 
notice of appeal. See id. at 538-39. Eavenson Auchmuty 
therefore controls our inquiry and leads us to conclude that 
the order from which Cepeda, Romero, and Torres appeal is 
effectively unreviewable after final judgment. 
 
The next question is whether our review of the order 
imposing sanctions will force us to examine the merits of 
the underlying case thereby rendering the appeal not 
completely separate from the merits. We have followed the 
rule that a "finding of separateness [in this regard] is 
dependent on the facts" in any given case. Martin v. Brown, 
63 F.3d 1252, 1261 n.11 (3d Cir. 1995).7  Here, our review 
of the order suspending Cepeda, Romero, and Torres would 
not force us to examine the merits of the case at all. 
Cepeda, Romero, and Torres each argue that the district 
court failed to afford them due process of law. Reviewing 
such a claim would require our examining the notice the 
court gave to Cepeda, Romero, and Torres, and the 
opportunity it gave them to be heard on the matter. This 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The rule in Martin is derived in part from two of our prior cases. In 
Eavenson Auchmuty, the Rule 11 sanction arose from the alleged 
violation of a court order, and resolution of the sanctions issue therefore 
did not touch on the merits of the underlying case. Rather, the sanctions 
issue turned on the interpretation of the order. See id. at 538, 541-43. 
We distinguished the facts of Eavenson Auchmuty  from those in Eastern 
Maico Distribs., Inc. v. Maico-Fahrzeugfabrik, G.m.b.H., 658 F.2d 944 (3d 
Cir. 1981), where the validity of the sanction turned in part on whether 
the material requested during discovery was relevant to the merits of the 
litigation. See id. at 947. Neither Eastern Maico nor Eavenson Auchmuty 
adopted a bright-line rule. Rather, taken together, the two cases suggest 
that a determination of separateness in this context must be on a case- 
by-case basis. 
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review of the process by which the court imposed the 
sanctions in no way touches on the merits. 
 
Finally, we must consider whether the process due an 
attorney prior to a court's suspending him is important in 
the Cohen sense. "[A]n issue is important if the interests 
that would potentially go unprotected without immediate 
appellate review of that issue are significant relative to the 
efficiency interests sought to be advanced by adherence to 
the final judgment rule." In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 
954, 959 (3d Cir. 1997). We addressed this very issue in 
Martin, and concluded that protection of the 
constitutionally recognized right of due process in this 
context is sufficiently important to warrant immediate 
appeal. See Martin, 63 F.3d at 1261. This is especially true 
where, as here, the sanction imposed is not a mere 
monetary fine but the more severe sanction of the 
suspension of an attorney from practicing before a court. 
Suspension, much more than a fine, "impose[s] significant 
burdens on the reputation and career opportunities of the 
sanctioned attorney." Id. Therefore, relying on Martin, we 
hold that the issue raised by Cepeda, Romero, and Torres 
on appeal satisfies the importance prong of the Cohen test. 
 
In sum, because we believe that the order suspending 
Cepeda, Romero, and Torres is collaterally final under 
Cohen, we hold that we have jurisdiction over the appeal of 
that order. 
 
B. The Process Due Prior to Suspending an Attorney 
 
Cepeda, Romero, and Torres submit that their 
suspensions cannot stand because the district court did 
not afford them particularized notice of the form of the 
sanctions they faced. They had no way of knowing, they 
contend, that the possibility of suspension as a sanction 
existed. Therefore, they conclude, their right to due process 
was infringed. Our review is plenary. See Martin, 63 F.3d at 
1262. 
 
In considering the suspension of an attorney as a 
sanction, courts must provide the attorney with due 
process. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 570 
(3d Cir. 1985) (noting that the imposition of a sanction on 
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an attorney, including disbarment and other disciplinary 
actions, implicates due process concerns); cf. Roadway 
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) ("Like other 
sanctions, attorney's fees certainly should not be assessed 
lightly or without fair notice and an opportunity for a 
hearing on the record."); Rogal v. American Broad. Cos., 74 
F.3d 40, 44 (3d Cir. 1996) ("The imposition of monetary 
sanctions by a court implicates fundamental notions of due 
process . . . ."). Although the precise contours of the 
process that is due varies given the particular context, "the 
fundamental requirements of due process -- notice and an 
opportunity to respond -- must be afforded before any 
sanction is imposed." Martin, 63 F.3d at 1261. Similarly, 
prior to the suspension of an attorney from practicing 
before the District Court of the Virgin Islands because of 
misconduct as defined by local rule, an attorney must be 
provided "notice and an opportunity to be heard." D.V.I. R. 
83.2(b)(4)(A). 
 
The party against whom sanctions are being considered 
is entitled to notice of the legal rule on which the sanctions 
would be based, the reasons for the sanctions, and the form 
of the potential sanctions. See Simmerman v. Corino, 27 
F.3d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 1994). Without such notice, the 
opportunity to be heard would be meaningless: "[o]nly with 
this information can a party respond to the court's 
concerns in an intelligent manner." Id. In other words, a 
party cannot adequately defend himself against the 
imposition of sanctions unless he or she is aware of the 
issues that must be addressed to avoid the sanctions. As 
one treatise writer has explained, "[d]ramatic differences in 
the relief being considered by the district court may lead to 
substantially different (e.g., more detailed, differently 
directed) responses by the alleged offender." Gregory P. 
Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse 
§ 17(D)(1)(d), at 343 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing Rule 11 
sanctions in particular). 
 
A brief examination of three of our cases illustrates the 
operation of this notice rule and the policy justifications 
supporting it. In Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman, P.C. v. 
Charter Technologies, Inc., 57 F.3d 1215 (3d Cir. 1995), we 
rejected a party's argument that he was denied adequate 
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notice because of the failure to notify him that sanctions 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, in addition to those under Rule 11, 
were being considered. We noted that a showing of bad 
faith conduct is required to impose sanctions under § 1927 
but is not required under Rule 11. See id. at 1225. Without 
notice that possible § 1927 sanctions were at stake, a party 
might not employ his opportunity to be heard to rebut 
charges of bad faith. However, our examination of the 
context and the factual background of the case revealed 
that the party was well aware that he was being charged 
with bad faith conduct. See id. at 1226-27. That he was 
unaware of the possible § 1927 sanctions was immaterial, 
for he knew that he would need to confront the charge of 
bad faith conduct to defend himself in the sanction 
proceeding. In short, our concern in Fellheimer was that the 
party in fact had the opportunity to mount a meaningful 
defense. When it became evident that under the 
circumstances he did, we determined that the notice had 
been adequate. 
 
In our discussion in Fellheimer, we distinguished Jones v. 
Pittsburgh National Corp., 899 F.2d 1350 (3d Cir. 1990). In 
Jones, the party was not explicitly notified of the possibility 
of § 1927 sanctions, nor did the context or factual 
background of the case suggest that he was charged with 
bad faith conduct. See id. at 1357. Because the party was 
not "on notice as to the particular factors that he must 
address if he is to avoid sanctions," notice was inadequate. 
See id. 
 
Although in both Fellheimer and Jones we focused on 
notice as to the legal rule on which the sanctions were 
based, particularized notice must also be given as to the 
form of the contemplated sanction, as is illustrated in 
Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1987) (per 
curiam). In Gagliardi, the party moving for sanctions under 
Rule 11 sought attorney's fees, dismissal of the underlying 
claim, and other relief the court might deem appropriate. 
See id. at 83. The court granted the sanctions in the form 
of an injunction. We explained that the general request for 
other appropriate relief did not put the party on notice that 
injunctive relief was possible. See id.8 Therefore, we vacated 
the award of sanctions and remanded so that the party 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We noted that the party against whom sanctions were imposed was 
proceeding pro se; however, we also noted that "[e]ven an experienced 
attorney would not have expected this type of injunctive sanction 
without some more specific notice." See Gagliardi, 834 F.2d at 83. 
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could be notified of the possibility of an injunction and 
respond accordingly. See id. 
 
In the present case, neither Cepeda, Romero, nor Torres 
received particularized notice that the court was 
contemplating suspending them from practicing law as a 
sanction. Although the court made clear the legal rules on 
which it would base sanctions and the reasons for the 
sanctions, the court limited its discussion of the form of the 
possible sanctions to monetary sanctions and dismissal of 
claims. See, e.g., Tutu II, 162 F.R.D. at 91. As far as we can 
tell, the possibility of suspension arose for the first time in 
the court's third and final published opinion on the matter, 
when the court actually imposed the suspensions. Neither 
did the parties moving for sanctions seek suspension; their 
papers before the district court sought only monetary 
sanctions and dismissal.9 
 
A number of parties have pointed to two judicial 
pronouncements that they contend should have put 
Cepeda, Romero, and Torres on at least constructive notice 
of the possibility of suspension. Even assuming that 
constructive notice would be sufficient, a doubtful 
proposition, we find these pronouncements to be 
inadequate. First, the court did mention, in passing during 
an October 28, 1993, hearing, the possible "breach of the 
Canon of Ethics." The court did not elaborate nor did it ever 
again raise the "Canon of Ethics." This mention is simply 
too vague, inconclusive, and preliminary to put Cepeda, 
Romero, or Torres on notice of the possible sanction of 
suspension. 
 
Second, the court noted that it planned to utilize its 
inherent powers as a basis for sanctions. A number of 
parties submit that, because a court may employ its 
inherent powers to suspend an attorney, Cepeda, Romero, 
and Torres should therefore have been on notice that the 
court was considering suspension. We are unpersuaded. As 
we discuss infra, a court's inherent powers put at its 
disposal a wide range of possible sanctions. Surely we 
cannot expect a party to defend against each and every one 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We are here relying on the assertions of Romero in his Brief of 
Appellant, and no party has asserted anything to the contrary. 
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of these possible sanctions simply because a court signals 
its intention to rely on such powers. Rather, more 
particularized notice is required. In this respect, we rely 
upon Gagliardi, 834 F.2d at 83. Just as in Gagliardi, in 
which we held that a request for any remedy the court 
might deem appropriate was too general to put a party on 
notice that an injunction might issue, we hold that the 
mere mention of a court's inherent powers does not put a 
party on notice that suspension is a possible sanction. 
 
Knowing that they faced possible suspension as well as 
possible monetary sanctions would have been vitally 
important to Cepeda, Romero, and Torres as they prepared 
for the sanctions proceedings. In addition to presenting 
legal and factual arguments pertaining to the particular 
conduct that gave rise to the sanctions proceedings and 
their individual culpability, the attorneys likely would have 
presented evidence concerning their professional careers, 
their contributions to the legal profession and the 
community, their character, and the like. The proceedings 
would have followed a different path as the alleged 
offenders led the court to consider a wider array of 
information. Put differently, had Cepeda, Romero, and 
Torres been on notice that they faced suspension, they 
doubtless would have utilized their opportunity to be heard 
to raise different matters. As it happened, because of the 
lack of notice, the attorneys' opportunity to be heard was 
less than meaningful; they were not given the appropriate 
opportunity to present relevant defenses to the penalties 
which they were ultimately assessed. 
 
We conclude that neither Cepeda, Romero, nor Torres 
received the particularized notice to which they were 
entitled. Because their rights to due process were violated, 
we will vacate that portion of the order on appeal 
suspending them from practice in the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Any suspension from practice, even in a jurisdiction in which an 
attorney does not regularly practice, would leave an indelible and 
deleterious imprint on the attorney's career, reputation, and future 
opportunities. Although we do not reach the question, we do express our 
doubt that, even on the record as developed, the extreme sanction of 
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III. THE COMMUNITY SERVICE SANCTION 
 
A. Appellate Jurisdiction 
 
As we discussed supra, part II, section A, although the 
order from which Esso and Goldman Antonetti appeal, 
which imposes on them a monetary sanction payable to the 
Community Service Sanction Account, is not final for the 
purposes of § 1291, the order as to Goldman Antonetti is 
collaterally final under the Cohen doctrine, for the same 
reasons the appeal of Cepeda, Romero, and Torres was 
collaterally final. See supra part II, section A.11 However, the 
collateral order doctrine does not provide us jurisdiction 
over Esso's appeal. Esso remains a party in the underlying 
litigation and can therefore bring an effective appeal after 
final judgment. In other words, Esso does not fall within 
the ambit of Eavenson, Auchmuty, and its appeal fails the 
third prong of the Cohen test. However, as we shall explain, 
we have pendent appellate jurisdiction over Esso's appeal. 
 
The doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction, in its 
broadest formulation, allows an appellate court in its 
discretion to exercise jurisdiction over issues that are not 
independently appealable but that are intertwined with 
issues over which the appellate court properly and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
suspension from practice was justified for the individual actions (or 
inactions) of Cepeda, Romero, and Torres. It would unduly prolong an 
already lengthy opinion to detail our reasons for this doubt, predicated 
as it is on a large record. We do, however, note that we do not suggest 
that district judges should never use suspension as a sanction. We also 
do not reach the issue whether Cepeda's pro hac vice status, see supra 
note 4, has any bearing on the ability of the court to suspend him. 
 
11. The only difference is whether the issue is important in the Cohen 
sense. We have held that resolution of a serious and unsettled question 
of law satisfies the importance criterion of Cohen. See In re Ford, 110 
F.3d at 961. Here, Esso and Goldman Antonetti appeal the district 
court's use of its inherent powers to require them to fund a Community 
Service Sanction Account for the benefit of the Virgin Islands, a third 
party to the litigation. We are unaware of any appellate decision that 
addresses this question. And, without guidance, the novel approach 
adopted by the district court might be emulated. The appeal, therefore, 
implicates a serious and unsettled question. 
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independently exercises its jurisdiction. See, e.g., 16 
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3937, at 684-85 (2d ed. 
1996). We recognize the doctrine of pendent appellate 
jurisdiction and have on a number of occasions discussed 
its scope. See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City Sav. 
F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 382-83 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1994); Hoxworth 
v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 208-09 (3d Cir. 
1990); United States v. Spears, 859 F.2d 284, 287 (3d Cir. 
1988); Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 445-59 (3d 
Cir. 1982). 
 
We have held that the discretionary exercise of pendent 
appellate jurisdiction is appropriate when the issue over 
which we have jurisdiction cannot be resolved without 
reference to the otherwise nonappealable issue. See 
Kershner, 670 F.2d at 449. In that sense, the exercise of 
pendent appellate jurisdiction ensures that our review of 
the independently appealable issue is meaningful. See Nat'l 
Union Fire, 28 F.3d at 382. Unfortunately, our 
jurisprudence in this area is not systematic, and it is not 
clear how broadly the doctrine applies in our circuit. It 
does, however, apply here.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. There are other matters that need mention with respect to our 
exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction. The appeal in question here is 
pendent to a collaterally final order, rather than to an order the 
interlocutory appeal of which is permitted by statute. The Supreme 
Court has stated that pendent appellate jurisdiction in such cases and 
under certain circumstances is not permitted. See Swint v. Chambers 
County Comm'n, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 1203, 1209-11 (1995); Abney v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 663 (1977). However, those cases deal with 
pendent issues, not pendent parties. And, at least in Swint, the Court 
made clear that its holding did not necessarily extend to circumstances 
in which the issues on appeal were "inextricably intertwined" or in which 
review of the otherwise nonappealable issue "was necessary to ensure 
meaningful review of the" independently appealable issue. Swint, 115 S. 
Ct. at 1212. In Spears, we employed the doctrine of pendent appellate 
jurisdiction in a case in which the independently appealable order was 
appealable only because of the collateral order doctrine. See Spears, 859 
F.2d at 286-88. We noted there that there was sufficient overlap in the 
facts relevant to the issues to allow us to exercise pendent appellate 
jurisdiction. See id. at 287-88. 
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This case presents for our consideration two appeals 
raising the identical legal challenge, one appeal that is 
collaterally final (Goldman Antonetti's) and one that is not 
(Esso's). Should we decline to exercise jurisdiction over 
Esso's appeal, we would surely face the issue again, after 
final judgment, at which time our resolution of Goldman 
Antonetti's appeal -- either because of collateral estoppel, 
the doctrine of the law of the case, or our own precedent -- 
would govern the outcome. In other words, for all practical 
purposes, our resolution of Goldman Antonetti's appeal 
resolves Esso's appeal. It makes little practical sense, then, 
to dismiss Esso's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and we 
shall not do so. See Spears, 859 F.2d at 288 ("In these 
circumstances, considerations of judicial economy, the 
litigant's interests, and practicality demand that we exercise 
jurisdiction over the [otherwise nonappealable] appeal."). 
 
As a final note on this subject, the use of the doctrine 
here would constitute pendent party appellate jurisdiction. 
See 16 Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 3937, at 690-96. 
Pendent appellate jurisdiction has heretofore only been 
employed to allow our review of an otherwise non- 
appealable issue related to an appealable issue, both issues 
having been appealed by the same party. Here, we employ 
pendent appellate jurisdiction to allow our review of related 
issues that have been appealed by two different parties. 
However, the case for exercising pendent (party) appellate 
jurisdiction here is so compelling and the circumstances of 
this appeal so unusual that we do not extend the law by 
much in holding that pendent appellate jurisdiction applies. 
 
B. The Appropriateness of the Community 
Service Sanction 
 
As previously noted, the district court employed its 
inherent powers to sanction Esso and Goldman Antonetti. 
A threshold question, then, might be whether the court's 
resort to the inherent powers, in lieu of the rule-based and 
statute-based sanctions -- e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 16, and 
37, or 28 U.S.C. § 1927 -- was appropriate.13 We need not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991), the Supreme Court 
discussed at length the inherent powers of a court to sanction and their 
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reach this question, however. As we shall discuss more 
fully below, the court had no authority under its inherent 
powers to impose the type of sanction it did. We are here 
reviewing a pure question of law; therefore, our standard of 
review is plenary. See Public Interest Research Group of New 
Jersey, Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1184 (3d Cir. 1995) 
[hereinafter "PIRG"]. 
 
The permissible scope of inherent powers is somewhat 
unclear; we have earlier observed that "the notion of 
inherent power has been described as nebulous, and its 
bounds `shadowy.' " Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 
557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (citation omitted). 
However, "courts under their inherent powers have 
developed a wide range of tools to promote efficiency in 
their courtrooms and to achieve justice in their results." Id. 
at 564. The Supreme Court has furnished us with at least 
a partial list of a court's inherent powers. Employing its 
inherent powers, a court can control admission to its bar, 
discipline attorneys, punish for contempt, vacate its own 
judgment upon a finding of fraud, bar a criminal defendant 
from a courtroom for disruptive behavior, dismiss a suit on 
forum non conveniens grounds or for failure to prosecute, 
and assess attorney's fees. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 
501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991). 
 
In addition to those mentioned by the Supreme Court, 
other inherent powers include the power to fine, to 
disqualify counsel, to preclude claims or defenses, and to 
limit a litigant's future access to the courts. See Joseph, 
supra § 28, at 440-47; see also Republic of the Philippines 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 73 n.10 (3d Cir. 
1994) (listing the inherent powers available to a court). 
With these many bows in their sanctioning quivers, courts 
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relationship to rule-based and statute-based powers to sanction, e.g., 
Rule 11, Rule 16, Rule 37, and § 1927. To oversimplify somewhat, the 
Court held that the existence of rule-based or statute-based powers does 
not preclude a court's employing its inherent powers. See id. at 46-51. 
The Court observed, but apparently did not require, that normally a 
court should look first to those rule-based or statute-based powers 
before turning to its inherent powers, reserving the inherent powers for 
instances in which the rule-based or statute-based powers are not "up 
to the task." See id. at 50. 
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have frequently invoked their inherent powers "to regulate 
the conduct of the members of the bar as well as to provide 
tools for docket management." Eash, 757 at 561. 
 
Notwithstanding the variety of tools available to a court 
under its inherent powers, we believe that an order 
directing a party to the litigation to remit funds to a third 
party is outside the scope of a court's inherent powers. We 
begin our analysis by noting that "[b]ecause of their very 
potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint 
and discretion." Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. That "inherent 
powers are shielded from direct democratic controls" makes 
this exercise of restraint and discretion even more 
important. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 
764 (1980). 
 
"A primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to 
fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses 
the judicial process." Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45 
(emphasis added). Whether creation of the Community 
Service Sanction Account before us here is appropriately 
within the scope of a court's inherent powers turns on the 
source of a court's inherent powers. The Supreme Court 
discussed the genesis and nature of inherent powers in 
Chambers. Inherent powers derive from the very nature of 
courts of justice. See id. at 42. Necessarily incident to the 
act of creating courts is the act of imbuing these 
institutions with certain indispensable powers to " `manage 
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and 
expeditious disposition of cases.' " Id.  (quoting Link v. 
Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)). Inherent 
powers are sometimes described, in other words, as those 
"necessary to the exercise of all others." Id. (quoting United 
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)). In 
Eash, we described the source of inherent powers in 
slightly different words. We suggested that inherent powers 
fall into three distinct categories: powers arising from 
Article III, powers arising from the nature of the court, and 
powers arising from historical notions of the courts of 
equity. See Eash, 757 F.2d at 562-64.14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Because Eash's categorization scheme was intended largely as a 
means of explaining the relationship between inherent judicial powers 
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No matter where one places their origin, it is clear that 
the power exercised in this case cannot be derived from a 
court's inherent powers. The district court's actions are 
essentially legislative in nature. Although we recognize that 
the line between a judicial act and legislative act is difficult 
to fix with certainty, see, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 
488 U.S. 361, 380-408 (1989); see also Clinton v. Jones, ___ 
U.S. ___, ___ S. Ct. ___, No. 95-1853, 1997 WL 273679, at 
*10 (U.S. Sup. Ct. May 27, 1997) ("Of course the lines 
between the powers of the three branches are not always 
neatly defined."), the district court's sanction here falls on 
the legislative side of whatever line we may draw. The court 
ordered the reallocation of resources from private entities to 
an agency of the public sector not a party in the case.15 It 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
and legislatively granted judicial powers, and because it is not necessary 
to tackle the difficult question of that relationship, see supra n.12, we 
have no occasion to revisit this categorization here. See also Chambers, 
501 U.S. at 47 n.12 (describing Eash's categorization scheme and 
concluding that discussion of it is unnecessary). 
 
15. We have addressed a similar question in the criminal context. See, 
e.g., United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 
1984). In that case, we rejected a district court's conditioning probation 
on the donation of $100,000 to charity. We held that the power of the 
court to place a defendant on probation arose from the probation 
statute, not from inherent powers. See id. at 961. We further held that 
the probation statute did not give courts the power to condition 
probation on the donation of money to a charity. See id. at 963-64. This 
decision was consistent with the decisions of other circuits addressing 
the same issue. See, e.g., United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 
741 F.2d 1542, 1546-51 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc); United States v. 
Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 650-53 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 
Although decided on facts somewhat analogous to those presented 
here, these cases provide little guidance. They do not discuss the scope 
of a court's inherent powers except to note that the power to suspend a 
criminal sentence and impose probation is not a power inherent in the 
courts. Rather, the focus of these cases is on whether the statutory grant 
of power to impose probation allows the courts to condition probation on 
a payment of charity. Here, by contrast, we know that the power to 
sanction is inherent in the courts. We are thus concerned with the scope 
of inherent, not statutory, powers. Therefore, that a district court cannot 
condition probation on the payment of charity does not control whether 
a district court can require the payment of charity as a sanction. Put 
differently, the existence of a limit on a court's statutory powers does not 
necessarily mean that there is a corresponding limit on a court's 
inherent powers. 
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chose from whom the resources would be taken and to 
whom the resources would redound, without regard to the 
anatomy of the case before it. In so doing, the court 
ventured well beyond the case and controversy before it.16 
 
We do not find persuasive the argument that a court's 
inherent powers include the wielding of what is essentially 
a legislative power. We believe that it is not in the nature of 
courts of justice normally to engage in the redistribution of 
wealth to parties outside of the litigation. We find nothing 
in Article III that allows for such a power. Further, we do 
not believe that such a power is necessary for the efficient 
functioning of a court. Fines made payable to the court 
would do just as well in ensuring that parties do not 
interfere with that functioning. From the standpoint of the 
sanctioned party, the disciplining effect of a fine made 
payable to the court is no different from the disciplining 
effect of a sanction made payable to some third party; the 
sanctioned party is out of pocket the same amount either 
way. Finally, we have been directed to no historical 
evidence demonstrating that courts of equity had this 
power, and given that the inherent powers must be 
exercised with restraint, we see no reason to permit this 
power now. 
 
As our discussion makes clear, the court redistributed a 
portion of the wealth in the Virgin Islands, not from one 
party in the litigation to another, but from one party in the 
litigation to another party of the court's choosing. We 
acknowledge that this reallocation occurred under the aegis 
of a sanctions proceedings; however, we may not be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. In the context of administrative law, commentators have drawn the 
line between legislative and adjudicative functions by referring to the 
factual evidence on which the relevant government body relies in making 
its decision. See 2 Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Administrative Law Treatise § 9.2, at 7-8 (3d ed. 1994). "[L]egislative facts 
are the general facts that help a government institution decide questions 
of law, policy, and discretion." Id. These are facts that concern more 
than just an individual. See id. Here, the court had to rely on facts 
outside of those provided it by the parties to determine that the Virgin 
Islands prison system was an appropriate recipient of funding. In that 
sense, the court was searching for legislative facts. It was, in that same 
sense, engaging in a nonadjudicatory function. 
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prevented from looking beyond mere labels to the 
underlying reality of the particular exercise of governmental 
power. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393. The reality in this 
case involved the exercise of legislative power. 
 
We appreciate the sense of outrage that motivated the 
district court's decision to impose the community service 
sanction. The contamination of the Tutu aquifer was tragic, 
and the delay in determining responsibility for that 
contamination is doubtless frustrating. The community 
service sanction, at least on its face, is attractive because it 
seeks to punish those who have caused, at least in part, 
that delay and assist those who might have been harmed 
by the contamination. In that sense, the district court's 
actions were admirable. However, a court does not always 
do well by doing good. Though we applaud the district 
court's motives, we are constrained to find fault with its 
remedy.17 
 
In sum, we hold that the district court's inherent powers 
can not support the imposition of the community service 
sanction.18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Our conclusion that the creation of the Community Service Sanction 
Account was beyond the powers of the district court is bolstered by our 
canvass of the law of our sister circuits. We are unaware of any court of 
appeals that has imposed this type of community service sanction. Nor 
do we find helpful the sources to which the district court cites for 
support of its proposed sanction. The district court could cite only to a 
law review article. See Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal 
Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions , 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1141 (1983). The article itself cited to two district court criminal cases 
in which, the article claimed, the courts imposed monetary sanctions 
directed to a community service project. See United States v. Olin Corp., 
Crim. No. 78-30, slip op. (D. Conn. June 1, 1978); United States v. Allied 
Chem. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Va. 1976). We find no support in 
those cases for imposing such a sanction here. The opinions themselves 
do not discuss the sanctions at all, though the law review article claims 
that the monetary sanctions were imposed as conditions for probation or 
nonprosecution. We cannot say for certain because of the lack of 
discussion by each of the courts on the matter, but we suspect that the 
courts' actions would be impermissible under the (old) probation statute. 
See supra note 15. 
 
18. Moreover, we have serious doubts that one could plausibly argue 
that Congress provided the courts -- by statute or by rule -- the power 
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IV. MONETARY SANCTIONS 
 
A. Appellate Jurisdiction 
 
We have jurisdiction over Goldman Antonetti's appeal 
challenging the imposition of the monetary sanctions 
directed to the other parties in the litigation pursuant to 
Eavenson Auchmuty. See supra part II, section A; part III, 
section A.19 As for the appeals of the remaining parties, we 
believe that we have jurisdiction over these appeals under 
the pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine.20 
 
As we discuss more fully infra part IV, section B, the 
remaining appeals (other than Goldman Antonetti's) 
contend that in imposing those sanctions the district court 
failed to account for the full extent of the harm caused by 
Esso's and Goldman Antonetti's discovery violations. These 
appeals are closely intertwined with Goldman Antonetti's 
appeal. The appropriate level of monetary sanctions for 
discovery abuse payable to a party in the litigation (the 
substance of the remaining parties' appeals) is, in part, 
dependent on the costs associated with the conduct giving 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to impose the type of sanction imposed here. In order to provide such 
power, we believe three criteria must be satisfied: (1) this must be a 
power that Congress can constitutionally delegate to a coordinate 
branch; (2) Congress must clearly indicate its intent to delegate this 
power; and (3) Congress must provide intelligible principles to guide the 
courts in the exercise of this power. None of these criteria is satisfied 
here." 
 
19. The substantive issues we will discuss here, see infra part IV, section 
B, are separate from the merits of the case. Therefore, there is no 
concern that the second prong of the Cohen test, which includes the 
requirement that the issue on appeal be separate from the merits of the 
underlying dispute, is not satisfied. The issues we discuss concern 
primarily the propriety of basing a sanction award on the costs 
associated with the sanctions proceedings themselves and the 
responsibility an aggrieved party has to detail for the court the harm a 
discovery violation caused him. Neither of these issues touches the 
merits of the underlying dispute. Further, because the circuit law on 
these subjects is somewhat unsettled, we believe that the substantive 
issues are important enough for immediate review. 
 
20. As we noted above, Esso does not appeal from that part of the order 
imposing monetary sanctions on it. 
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rise to the sanctions (the substance of the Goldman 
Antonetti appeal). We therefore cannot conclusively and 
finally determine whether the sanctions imposed on 
Goldman Antonetti are too harsh without also determining 
whether those same sanctions adequately accounted for the 
harm caused to the other parties. 
 
In exercising jurisdiction here, we are exercising 
jurisdiction over the appeals by the parties to whom Esso 
was directed to pay sanctions. Because Esso has not 
appealed this aspect of the district court's order, the 
reasons for our use of pendent appellate jurisdiction are 
slightly different from the reasons for our use of that 
doctrine to review the appeals of the parties to whom 
Goldman Antonetti was directed to pay sanctions. First, the 
harm, if any, caused by Goldman Antonetti's discovery 
violations affected all of the parties, though to a varying 
degree; that some of those parties were to be paid by Esso 
rather than Goldman Antonetti had nothing to do with 
whether Esso or Goldman Antonetti had harmed them. Put 
differently, the question whether Goldman Antonetti's 
discovery violations caused harm affects all the parties to 
whom sanctions were directed. Therefore, for the same 
reasons that Goldman Antonetti's appeal and the appeals of 
the parties to whom Goldman Antonetti was directed to pay 
sanctions are closely intertwined, so too are the appeals of 
the parties to whom Esso was directed to pay sanctions 
closely intertwined with Goldman Antonetti's appeal. 
 
Second, we resolve these appeals, see infra part IV, 
section B, by reference to the same issue that governs the 
appeals of the parties to whom Goldman Antonetti was 
directed to pay sanctions, namely, the responsibility an 
aggrieved party has to specify for the court the harm 
caused by a discovery violation. Therefore, as with our 
review of the district court's use of inherent powers, see 
supra part III, section A, practical realities strongly suggest 
that we exercise jurisdiction over all the appeals here. 
Otherwise, as above, we would surely face the issue again, 
after final judgment, at which time our resolution of the 
appeals of the parties to whom Goldman Antonetti was 
directed to pay sanctions -- either because of collateral 
estoppel, the doctrine of the law of the case, or our own 
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precedent -- would govern the outcome as to the parties to 
whom Esso was directed to pay sanctions. 
 
In sum, our resolution of these appeals resolves the 
remaining appeals. It makes little practical sense to dismiss 
some of these appeals for lack of jurisdiction, hence we 
shall not do so. See Spears, 859 F.2d at 288 ("In these 
circumstances, considerations of judicial economy, the 
litigant's interests, and practicality demand that we exercise 
jurisdiction over the [otherwise nonappealable] appeal."). As 
in part III, section A, the case for exercising pendent (party) 
appellate jurisdiction here is so compelling and the 
circumstances of this appeal so unusual that we do not 
extend the law by much in holding that pendent appellate 
jurisdiction applies here. We therefore will review that part 
of the district court's order imposing monetary sanctions 
directed to parties to the litigation. 
 
B. Was the Monetary Sanction Appropriate? 21 
  
1. Introduction and Standard of Review 
 
Our review of the award of monetary sanctions must 
address dual concerns. First, we must examine the 
sanctions award from the standpoint of Goldman Antonetti, 
which contends that the district court erred in imposing 
sanctions at all. Second, the parties to whom the court 
awarded sanctions argue that the sanctions were 
inadequate to account for the full scope of the harm they 
suffered as a result of Esso's and Goldman Antonetti's 
discovery violations. 
 
The standard governing the district court's award of 
sanctions is a legal question subject to plenary review. See 
PIRG, 51 F.3d at 1184; cf. Martin, 63 F.3d at 1262 
(subjecting a claim that a sanction proceeding violated due 
process requirements to plenary review). If a district court 
applies the proper legal standard, then the award of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. The analysis that follows in the text does not make a distinction 
between inherent powers sanctions and statute-based or rule-based 
sanctions. In respects relevant to our discussion, the sanctioning tools 
are the same. 
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sanctions, including the extent of those sanctions, is within 
the discretion of the district court. See PIRG , 51 F.3d at 
1184; see also Chambers, 501 U.S. at 55 ("We review a 
court's imposition of sanctions under its inherent powers 
for abuse of discretion."). "An abuse of discretion is a `clear 
error of judgment,' and not simply a different result which 
can arguably be obtained when applying the law to the 
facts of the case." United Telegraph Workers, AFL-CIO v. 
Western Union Corp., 771 F.2d 699, 703 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402, 416 (1971)). To determine whether a district court 
abused its discretion, "we evaluate the court's factual 
determinations, legal conclusions, and choice of an 
`appropriate sanction' with substantial deference, 
considering not whether we would make the same precise 
determinations, but only whether those determinations are 
contrary to reason or without a reasonable basis in law and 
fact." Simmerman, 27 F.3d at 62. 
 
2. Did the District Court Abuse its Discretion in 
Sanctioning Goldman Antonetti? 
 
Goldman Antonetti submits that the district court made 
a number of factual and legal errors serious enough to 
warrant our reversing its decision to impose sanctions. 
First, the firm argues that costs and expenses associated 
with the sanctions hearings themselves are not recoverable 
as sanctions. Next, it contends that the district court failed 
to identify the individual acts for which it is liable for 
sanctions. Even assuming that there were individual acts 
that might be sanctionable, Goldman Antonetti further 
contends that such acts caused the moving parties no 
prejudice. At all events, it concludes, the parties seeking 
sanctions had already released the firm from liability. 
 
a. Can Sanctions be Based on the Costs of 
Sanctioning Proceedings? 
 
Goldman Antonetti argues that the district court 
impermissibly awarded sanctions based on the costs and 
expenses arising from the sanctions proceedings 
themselves. In the firm's submission, such an award 
 
                                36 
constitutes improper fee shifting. We disagree. It is beyond 
dispute that attorney's fees are, in certain circumstances, 
properly awarded as a sanction. We are unaware of 
precedent in this circuit that categorically excludes from 
such an award attorney's fees arising from the sanctions 
proceedings themselves (though, as we discuss below, there 
is precedent in other circuits that bears on this issue).22 
Nor do we believe such a categorical exclusion is wise. The 
time, effort, and resources expended in bringing 
sanctionable conduct to light would have been unnecessary 
had the sanctionable conduct never occurred. These costs 
are as much a harm to a party in the litigation as is the 
delay in the litigation or the substantive prejudice caused 
by the conduct. If we exclude from a possible award the 
costs of sanctions proceedings, we would undermine the 
compensatory goal of a sanctions award. 
 
Further, if a party is aware ex ante that the costs he 
incurs in exposing sanctionable conduct will never be 
recouped, that party may decide to forgo a sanctions 
proceeding altogether. In doing so, however, that party 
might allow otherwise sanctionable conduct to go 
unaddressed. In such cases, the deterrent goal of a 
sanction award has been lost; parties who know that the 
likelihood of facing a sanction proceeding are low may 
engage in sanctionable conduct more often. Therefore, we 
believe a district court, in the exercise of its discretion, may 
award attorney's fees arising from sanctions proceedings. 
 
We are aware of precedent in other circuits that has 
disallowed such awards in the Rule 11 context. See, e.g., 
Zimmerman v. Bishop Estate, 25 F.3d 784, 790 (9th Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. In Chambers, in which the Supreme Court affirmed in all respects 
the award of sanctions in the case, see Chambers, 501 U.S. at 55-58, 
the district court employed its inherent powers to award sanctions based 
in part on the costs associated with the sanctions proceedings 
themselves. See NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 124 
F.R.D. 120, 143 (W.D. La. 1989), aff'd, 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1990), 
aff'd sub nom., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991). Although 
the Supreme Court did not directly address the precise issue we address 
here, and there is no indication that the parties raised it, the Court at 
least implicitly approved of a sanction award based on the costs 
associated with the sanctions proceedings themselves. 
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1994); Pan-Pacific and Low Ball Cable Television Co. v. 
Pacific Union Co., 987 F.2d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1993); 
Lockary v. Kayfetz, 974 F.2d 1166, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1387 (4th 
Cir. 1991); Blue v. United States Dept. of the Army, 914 
F.2d 525, 548-49 (4th Cir. 1990).23 However, better 
reasoned precedent in still other circuits supports our view 
that the costs associated with the sanctions proceedings 
themselves can be recoverable. See, e.g., Kirk Capital Corp. 
v. Bailey, 16 F.3d 1485, 1491 (8th Cir. 1994); Silva v. 
Witschen, 19 F.3d 725, 733 n.15 (1st Cir. 1994); Brandt v. 
Schal Assocs., Inc., 960 F.2d 640, 649-51 (7th Cir. 1992); 
In re Stauffer Seeds, Inc., 817 F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(Rule 37). 
 
In addition, in 1993, Rule 11 was amended to add 
language that would allow sanctions for the costs 
associated with presenting or opposing a motion for Rule 
11 sanctions. See Joseph, supra, § 16(B)(17), at 278. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. A number of these cases take guidance from Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990), in which the Supreme Court held 
that Rule 11 does not allow the recovery of the costs associated with 
defending a sanction award on appeal. See id. at 406-09. We believe that 
reliance on Cooter & Gell to hold that Rule 11 does not allow recovery of 
the costs associated with the sanctions proceedings themselves is 
misplaced. The Court in Cooter & Gell was moved by a number of 
context-based factors. First, the Court noted that Rule 11 does not apply 
to appeals, and that applying Rule 11 to appeals would upset the 
scheme, contained in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, for 
sanctioning frivolous appeals. See id. at 406, 408. Allowing a Rule 11 
award based on the sanctions proceedings themselves, would not, 
however, implicate the Rules of Appellate Procedure at all because such 
proceedings inhere in the district court. Further, borrowing from the 
proximate cause theories of tort law, the Court noted that costs on 
appeal were a result of the sanction itself and the appeal, not a result of 
the improper filing. See id. at 406-07. The costs of the sanctions 
proceedings, however, are more properly characterized as the result of 
the improper filing. Finally, the Court feared that allowing recovery of the 
costs of appeal would discourage sanctioned parties from pursuing 
meritorious appeals. See id. at 407. Allowing recovery of the costs 
associated with the sanctions proceedings has no effect on the pursuit 
of meritorious appeals and, as we note in the text, allowing such 
recovery might encourage parties to bring sanctionable conduct to light. 
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language in Rule 11 now states that "the court may award 
to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable 
expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or 
opposing the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A). That 
amendment seems to have effectively overruled cases that 
held that it is an abuse of discretion to award sanctions 
based on the costs of sanctions proceedings.24 
 
b. Actions Giving Rise to Sanctions Against 
Goldman Antonetti 
 
Goldman Antonetti is correct in pointing out that the 
district court did not identify with specificity many of the 
acts that caused it to infer that Esso and Goldman 
Antonetti were engaged in a pattern of delay. The court did, 
however, make extensive findings as to the Agrelot 
memorandum and the anomaly investigation. With respect 
to both of those matters, the district court's findings were 
not unreasonable. The undisputed fact is that the Agrelot 
memorandum did not surface until well after discovery had 
begun and until well after parties to the litigation had made 
repeated requests that clearly covered the document. 
 
Goldman Antonetti advances a plausible explanation for 
why the Agrelot memorandum was produced so late in the 
litigation. It is certainly possible that no attorney from 
Goldman Antonetti knew of the Agrelot memorandum until 
it was found in October 1993, notwithstanding testimony to 
the contrary; it is equally possible that the Agrelot 
memorandum was misfiled by both Soil Tech and by 
Goldman Antonetti. That is not to say, however, that the 
court's findings, which are based on an inference that 
Goldman Antonetti intentionally withheld the Agrelot 
memorandum, are unreasonable. There is evidence in the 
record that Goldman Antonetti attorneys knew of the 
memorandum's existence. Those same attorneys responded 
to the discovery requests covering such memorandum, and 
yet the document was not produced. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. We are aware of only one case decided after the 1993 amendment to 
Rule 11 that disallowed such an award; however, the opinion did not cite 
the amendment and uncritically applied prior circuit precedent. See 
Zimmerman, 25 F.3d at 790 (citing Lockary). 
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With respect to the anomaly investigation, our analysis is 
similar. Goldman Antonetti relies on a report by a 
magistrate judge concluding that the firm's actions during 
the investigation amounted to nothing more than zealous 
advocacy in representation of its clients and therefore did 
not warrant sanctions. The firm submits that the district 
court had no basis to disagree with the magistrate judge's 
conclusions. However, the district court in that instance did 
not owe the magistrate judge any deference. Further, the 
undisputed evidence makes it clear that it was not 
unreasonable for the district court to conclude that the 
delays in the investigation were willful and in bad faith. The 
investigation began late, was aborted prematurely because 
of the failure of the parties to arrive with appropriate 
equipment, and was not completed for many months. 
 
Goldman Antonetti's next argument -- that the failure to 
produce the Agrelot memorandum caused no harm to the 
other parties in the litigation -- suffers the same fate. The 
firm here stresses that it produced the entire ETC report, of 
which the Agrelot memorandum was merely a summary. If, 
Goldman Antonetti questions, a full report has been 
produced, how can the failure to produce a summary of the 
report cause any harm to a party that can easily 
summarize the report for itself? The firm has a good point, 
but it does not mean that the district court's conclusion 
was contrary to reason. The ETC report was both complex 
and voluminous. Examining it required significant costs. A 
summary prepared by an expert would have reduced these 
costs and identified the problems that could only have been 
discovered by imposing a considerable burden on those 
examining the report for the first time. We concede, as did 
the district court, that the summary, timely produced, 
might have provided the parties to the litigation with less 
assistance than they claim. Still, it would have provided 
assistance, and that is the crux of the harm caused by the 
failure of Esso and Goldman Antonetti to produce the 
Agrelot memorandum. 
 
c. Was Goldman Antonetti Released from Sanctions? 
 
Goldman Antonetti also argues that three of the parties 
seeking sanctions from it -- Four Winds, Laga, and Western 
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Auto Supply -- have already released the firm from liability. 
Goldman Antonetti bases this argument on the settlement 
agreement reached between Esso and these parties in 
which the parties settled the underlying litigation and 
released Esso and "their . . . attorneys" from liability. 
Because Goldman Antonetti served as Esso's attorneys, it 
follows, Goldman Antonetti reasons, that the settlement 
agreement eliminates the possibility that these parties can 
collect a sanctions award from Goldman Antonetti. The 
district court disagreed. "Because the interpretation of 
contractual language to discern contractual intent is a 
question of fact, our review is limited to a determination 
whether the district court's findings are clearly erroneous." 
Painewebber Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 510 (3d Cir. 
1990). 
 
The issue, then, is whether the parties intended the term 
"attorneys" in the settlement agreement to refer only to 
counsel representing Esso at the time of the signing of the 
agreement, or also to refer to counsel who had represented 
Esso previously. The district court held that the release -- 
a contract -- does not cover Goldman Antonetti for two 
reasons. First, by the time the settlement agreement came 
into force, Esso had already severed its relationship with 
Goldman Antonetti. Because the term "attorneys" plainly 
refers only to counsel representing Esso at the time of the 
settlement agreement, the term must not encompass 
Goldman Antonetti. Second, even assuming that the 
examination of extrinsic evidence is appropriate here either 
to explain the term "attorneys" or to show that the parties 
attached some special meaning to "attorneys," there is no 
extrinsic evidence that the parties to the settlement 
intended it to cover Goldman Antonetti. Goldman Antonetti 
offers and our review of the record suggests nothing-- save 
the language of the settlement agreement, which does not, 
by its terms, cover Goldman Antonetti -- that would lead 
us to conclude that the district court's findings were clearly 
erroneous under any legal standard governing 
interpretation of a contractual term. 
 
In sum, we are satisfied that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in concluding that Goldman Antonetti 
is subject to some form of sanction and that $120,000 was 
an appropriate sanction. 
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3. The Process of Determining the Extent of Harm 
Caused by Discovery Violations 
 
The movants appeal the measure of the sanctions the 
court awarded to them. They argue that the process the 
court undertook to determine the extent of the harm 
caused by the sanctionable conduct was in error, first 
because the district court ruled that their submissions 
detailing their harm were inadequate, and second because 
the district court awarded a uniform level of sanction based 
on the submission of one party. It would be useful, then, to 
begin by briefly describing that process. 
 
Having held that the discovery violations caused harm, 
the court examined the papers these parties submitted that 
purported to describe the extent of that harm. The court 
believed that the papers "suffer[ed] from two shortcomings." 
Tutu III, 166 F.R.D. at 342. First, the papers did not 
adequately categorize the claimed harm within the 
framework the court had created for addressing the 
sanctionable conduct. The court found it difficult to 
determine whether the moving parties were seeking costs 
and expenses from (1) discovery violations related to the 
search for evidence of contamination at ETSS; (2) the 
failure to disclose the Agrelot memo; or (3) the sanctions 
proceedings themselves, the three broad areas into which 
the court held sanctionable conduct fell. Second, the court 
faulted the parties for their general failure to provide it with 
documentation "that adequately and efficiently explained to 
the court how those expenses could be justified as a 
sanction." Id. 
 
These shortcomings led the court to award only a portion 
of the sanctions sought. The court declined to scrutinize 
the voluminous submissions of the parties in order to 
perform the categorization it had requested the parties to 
perform. Instead, the court simply denied the award of 
sanctions arising from (1) discovery violations related to the 
search for evidence of contamination at ETSS; and (2) the 
failure to disclose the Agrelot memo. The court did, 
however, award sanctions arising from the sanctions 
proceedings themselves. The court set a uniform level of 
sanction award based on L'Henri's request. The court did so 
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because it believed that L'Henri's request was clear, well 
supported, and, in all, "unassailable." 
 
a. The Failure of the Submission 
 
We believe that the district court was well within its 
discretion to deny the requested sanctions based upon the 
parties' submissions. Our independent review of the 
submissions generally confirms the district court's view 
that they are less than helpful. The submissions are 
voluminous, are not well organized, and, at bottom, are 
unclear. It would take an enormous effort to impress upon 
them the order necessary for a reasoned decision, including 
the making of a reasoned judgment as to the validity of the 
requests contained therein. Although we suspect that, had 
the district court chosen to undertake such an effort, the 
material submitted might ultimately have supported the 
award of additional sanctions, we do not believe that it was 
unreasonable or a clear error of judgment for the district 
court to refuse such a huge task. 
 
Engaging the submissions on their own terms would 
cause great delays in a complex case already delayed by 
discovery violations and already taxing judicial resources. 
In short, the district court exercised its discretion in such 
a manner so as to prevent "a second major litigation." 
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (discussing 
a request for attorney's fees in civil rights litigation). We do 
not believe that by doing so the district court abused its 
discretion. 
 
Instructive in this regard are cases addressing requests 
for attorney's fees under civil rights or other similar 
statutes that allow for fee shifting in certain circumstances. 
These cases make clear that the applicant for fees has an 
affirmative responsibility to assist the court in sorting 
through, organizing, and evaluating a fee request. The 
Supreme Court has stated that in such cases the "fee 
applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to 
an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended 
and hourly rates." Id. In submitting an application, the 
applicant must exercise "billing judgment" by making a 
"good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that 
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are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Id. at 
434. As we stated in Hall v. Borough of Roselle, 747 F.2d 
838 (3d Cir. 1984), "members of the bar are quasi-officers 
of the court and they are expected to be careful . .. in their 
representations to the court." Id. at 841-42. Busy district 
judges cannot be expected to do lawyers' work. 
 
In sum, as with requests for attorney's fees, in assessing 
the harm discovery violations may have caused to litigants, 
district courts deserve the conscientious assistance of 
lawyers. Although a court is free to do so, it is not 
incumbent upon a district court to devote its own valuable 
time, energy, and resources to remedy the shortcomings of 
movants' submissions if that assistance falls short. Nor will 
we require the court to do so here. We thus do not believe 
the district court abused its discretion in refusing to award 
sanctions based on the submissions of the movants. 
 
b. Basing the Sanctions on L'Henri's Request 
 
We also believe that the district court was within its 
discretion to award each party a uniform level of sanction 
to compensate the parties for their participation in the 
sanctions proceedings, and to base that uniform level on 
the submission of L'Henri. The decision to impose a 
uniform level of sanction suggests that the court believed 
that the amount of effort appropriately expended in 
preparing for and participating in the sanctions proceedings 
was uniform across the various parties. Such a belief was 
not unreasonable here since the parties were similarly 
situated. 
 
According to the court, L'Henri's counsel, Nancy D'Anna, 
submitted well-reasoned, thoroughly researched, and 
adequately documented material to the court throughout 
the sanctions proceedings. What is more, the court 
continued, L'Henri produced such material efficiently and 
relatively cheaply. In deciding to base the uniform level of 
sanction on L'Henri's request, the district court implicitly 
found that each party could have produced similarly well- 
reasoned, thorough, and adequately documented material 
for no greater cost than that incurred by L'Henri. We 
believe that it is not an abuse of discretion for the district 
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court to assume that all parties can produce work of 
L'Henri's quality for approximately the same cost. 
 
In sum, we believe the district court acted within its 
discretion in awarding only a portion of the monetary 
sanctions sought by the moving parties. 
 
V. CLAIMS FOR CERCLA CONTRIBUTION 
 
Unfortunately, we have no appellate jurisdiction over that 
portion of the district court's order rejecting the motion to 
dismiss Esso's claims for CERCLA contribution as a 
sanction under Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 
747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984). Poulis sets out a six-factor 
balancing test to guide a court's analysis as to whether to 
dismiss a claim as a sanction. See id. at 868. One of those 
factors requires that we examine the "meritoriousness of the 
claim or defense." Id. (emphasis in original). However, the 
CERCLA claims have never been filed, though they 
undoubtedly will be. The district court, in an effort to stem 
the voluminous paper flow, has apparently asked counsel 
to withhold moving forward on the CERCLA claims until a 
more propitious point in the litigation. Therefore, under the 
current posture of the case we would be hard pressed to 
find some means to review contentions with respect to 
these claims. 
 
If this problem did not exist, the parties might argue that 
we have jurisdiction over the Poulis claim under the 
collateral order doctrine as set forth in Cohen.25 However, 
the Cohen test would allow us to exercise jurisdiction only 
if, inter alia, our review would not require us to examine 
the merits of the underlying litigation that remains to be 
adjudicated. To review the Poulis claim, we would need to 
do just that because Poulis requires us to examine the 
merits of the underlying CERCLA litigation. 
 
Additionally, the Cohen test does not allow our exercise of 
appellate jurisdiction over a non-final order if the order can 
be appealed effectively after final judgment. Here, there can 
be little dispute that the parties can appeal the Poulis claim 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. As we explain supra section II, part A, the district court's order is not 
final for appellate jurisdiction purposes. 
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after final judgment, by which time the claim will likely be 
better defined. We therefore have no jurisdiction over that 
part of the district court's order denying the motion to 
dismiss Esso's claim for contribution as a sanction, and 
will dismiss the appeals challenging that part of the order. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The order of the district court will be affirmed insofar as 
it imposes a $120,000 sanction on Goldman Antonetti and 
insofar as it rejects the claims for additional sanctions 
against Esso and Goldman Antonetti, but will be reversed 
insofar as it orders the suspension of Cepeda, Romero, and 
Torres and insofar as it requires Esso and Goldman 
Antonetti to fund a Community Service Sanction Account. 
The appeals relating to the refusal of the district court to 
dismiss Esso's claims for contribution will be dismissed. 
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